man as in California. Deregulation should extend to campaign contributions and expenditures. Given the relative paucity of state party coffers, individuals should be allowed to contribute unlimited sums to state party organizations coupled with full disclosure of such contributions. As legislators deliberate these matters, they should be governed by the words of the Committee in a 1984 position paper:

As private associations with public responsibilities, parties should be as free as possible from state and federal regulation to determine their own structure and functions. The public interest requires that parties operate in an open, honest, fair, and accountable way, but these goals may be achieved through reporting and disclosure requirements and not by detailed regulation of party organization and activities. ... The public interest is best served by law that complements party self-regulation not by statutes that substitute for it.

Conclusion

Not all state parties will reinvigorate themselves using the same methods. What works in Massachusetts, may not in nearby Connecticut or in far-away California. However, the Committee for Party Renewal urges state parties to try. This position paper outlines some measures that, if adopted, would strengthen the party apparatuses. As the states begin their deliberations, we urge party officials and lawmakers to remember the words of E. E. Schattschneider (1942, p. 1): "Parties are not appendages of modern government; they are at the center of it and play a determinative and creative role in it."

References

"Strengthening the Political Parties," position paper adopted by the Committee for Party Renewal in 1980 and presented to both national party committees.
Features

the terms of survival in the nuclear age. It has won praise from "realists" such as Alexander Dalin, Robert Conquest, George Breslauer, and William Colby. The book, Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking, has also received praise from such respected Soviet professionals as Georgi Shakhtnazarov, a Vice President of the International Political Science Association.

How could this initiative succeed? "We are opportunists in the best sense of the word," said Richard Rathbun, President of Beyond War. "We looked for openings and made the most of them."

"We looked for openings
and made the most of
them."

The first opening occurred when loose talk about nuclear warfare in the early eighties precipitated concern that the earth might be destroyed. The Freeze movement began. The film, "The Last Epidemic," was produced by Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Palo Alto, California, Creative Initiative Foundation, headed by Rathbun, saw the nuclear threat and reoriented their program to deal with that danger. As they studied the problem, they concluded that the menace of nuclear war could not be separated from that of war in general. Even small wars could escalate out of control into the holocaust. Conversely, nuclear disarmament would not occur so long as the nations feared conventional war. Since this reality was so different from general societal beliefs, Beyond War sought to carry out an unprecedented educational effort to change world thinking and behavior. To save the planet, the new organization worked to extend human concern to the entire world, going beyond national loyalties.

Since its inception in 1982, Beyond War has expanded into a nation-wide movement, operating in more than thirty-five states. Yet the persistent question raised by Americans was: "What about the Russians?" The power rivalry between the superpowers appeared to be an impossible barrier, but Beyond War sought to find another opening. William McGlashan, a former businessman and venture capitalist, and currently Vice President for International Affairs of Beyond War, visited the Soviet Union in 1983. He quickly ruled out the official Soviet peace and friendship organizations. "These are people whose job it is to explain the straight Soviet party line to foreigners. We had to sit through a lot of it at first, but we simply stopped going back to them," he said (William McGlashan interview with J. Briscoe, November 30, 1987). Martin Hellman, Stanford University Professor of Electrical Engineering, who eventually became Editor-in-Chief for the American side of the project, explained, "We could accept many of their points concerning nuclear weapons, but we found that they only wanted the United States to change. They became highly defensive if we mentioned the ways the Soviet Union had to change" (Martin Hellman interview with J. Briscoe, November 23, 1987).

... Soviet scientists were accustomed to the belief that nuclear war would be suicidal for all sides, but were unaccustomed to the thought that all war must be dropped from the practice of nations.

Two members of Beyond War had relationships with individual Soviet scientists. Hellman, with interests in information theory, had been host to visiting Soviet scientists in the seventies and had attended symposia in the U.S.S.R. at the invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Dr. Harold Sandler, a cardiologist with NASA,
participated in joint space medicine experiments with the Soviet Union over a period of eighteen years. Sandler spoke Russian and was acquainted with Dr. Yevgeny Chazov, past Co-President of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and now Minister of Health of the U.S.S.R. Both Hellman and Sandler found that with objective individuals they could make more open statements and avoid the need to defend national honor.

... both sides saw that progress required a shift from blame to responsibility.

The honesty of these scientific contacts created an opening for a Beyond War "International Scientific Initiative." Hellman went to Moscow in September, 1984, where he spoke with Roald Sagdeev, and made contact with the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace Against the Nuclear Threat. The founding Chairman of the Soviet Committee was Academician Evgeni Velikhov, now principal scientific adviser to Secretary Gorbachev. The three Deputy Chairmen are Academician Roald Sagdeev, Professor Andrei Kokoshin and Professor Sergei Kapitza. Organized by twenty-five leading Soviet scientists, the body primarily published technical papers on arms control from a scientific perspective. While the name of the organization makes it appear to be another official peace group, it was not cagmatic in its relations with the Americans.

The first American requests for Soviet cooperation were proposals to hold an international conference, with the possibility of taping parts for television use in both countries. Since both sides were strangers to each other, they required three years to develop rapport, but a beginning was made by a joint television spacebridge. Using satellite communications to audiences both in Moscow and in San Francisco, Beyond War honored the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War for its efforts in public education. Dr. Yevgeny Chazov and Dr. Bernard Lown received the award on behalf of their organization. Beyond War set up a presentation at the United Nations in New York, where ambassadors were invited to hear Professor Kapitza, along with Professor Carl Sagan, talk on the menace of nuclear weapons to the fragile ecology of the planet. McGlashan felt these events helped to build credibility for the American organization with Kapitza, and Kapitza's own objective and straightforward speech to them convinced the Beyond War organizers that he was a worthwhile colleague. As the star of a Soviet televised science program which was broadcast twice each week, Kapitza was known to as many Soviet citizens as Sagan was known to Americans.

While these approaches were taking place in late 1984 and early 1985, Hellman prepared a proposal for Kapitza which suggested a scientists' meeting. Only ten scientists would be invited from each side to generate answers to the problem of bringing about the new thinking required for survival (USA/USSR Task Force to Build a World Beyond War. Draft Proposal for Meeting of American and Soviet Scientists, November 16, 1984 (Hellman Files)).

Both sides were reluctant to move at first: Beyond War was afraid that the Soviet experts would be unable to speak freely, and perhaps the Committee of Soviet Scientists were unsure how effective Beyond War would be as an ally. In January of 1985, Kapitza asked for a postponement for further consideration, and the Americans were surprised in June, when he wired the Beyond War team for a more detailed proposal.

... Soviet social science is concerned with huge forces of history.

The Americans in September, 1985, set out principles for which they stood. The eight basic points included such statements as these:
The threat of nuclear war cannot be separated from that of conventional war. . . . War, in all its forms, has therefore ceased to be a survival mechanism and, instead, has become an extinction mechanism. Nuclear weapons are not the real problem. Even complete nuclear disarmament, by itself, would not eliminate the nuclear threat. . . . The only long-range solution is to shift to a new mode of thinking which precludes the possibility of all war and thereby eliminates the nuclear threat once and for all” (Telex, Richard Ratibun to Andrei Kokoshin et al., September 9, 1985, Attachment A [Hellman Files]).

We would talk about the “process of change,” and building a constituency for change, and they could not understand what we meant.

When the Americans first explored these proposed principles with the scientists of the Soviet Union, they found that most of the Soviet scientists were accustomed to the belief that nuclear war would be suicidal for all sides, but were unaccustomed to the thought that all war must be dropped from the practice of nations. When the Americans went to see Andrei Kokoshin the first time, he questioned their position that even small wars are no longer practical and just. “What about South Africa?” he asked. Hellman answered, “if the U.S.S.R. saw that continued support for violent wars of liberation would lead eventually to its own destruction in a nuclear war, could they not find another way to liberate the blacks in South Africa?” The Americans did not insist on complete agreement, but maintained an amicable spirit and continued discussions. A year later, Kokoshin agreed on the long-run objective, and his question became how to get there (Martin Hellman interview with J. Briscoe, November 23, 1987).

The first interviews with Anatoly Gromyko, Director of the Institute of African Studies, and the son of the President of the Supreme Soviet, followed a similar pattern. Perhaps because of his knowledge of colonialism in Africa, Gromyko appeared to be prejudiced against Americans when he laid out a long list of grievances against the West. However, as the project developed, both sides saw that progress required a shift from blame to responsibility. Gromyko became one of the staunchest advocates of that policy (William McElhaney interview with J. Briscoe, November 30, 1987).

Events began to move after the fall of 1985. Hellman and Craig Barnes, an attorney and participant in the Beyond War team, visited Moscow, and the two committees settled upon carefully selecting participants and papers for a conference in three sections, one showing the many ways a nuclear war could start, a second showing what global thinking involved, and a third showing how changes that were impossible in the current environment could become possible if change were viewed as a process spread over time. Each agreed that it would not publicly make demands for policy alterations by the opposite government (Draft Memorandum of Understanding: Initiative by the International Scientific Community to Eliminate the Nuclear Threat by Building a World Beyond War, October, 1985 [Hellman Files]).

Each side was concerned that a conference, inadequately planned, would turn out to be a set of diatribes against the other’s country. Even setting a conference date puts pressure to make choices in haste. Thus, when, in November of 1986, Alexander Nikitin, Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, proposed a jointly written book, Beyond War enthusiastically agreed. Each of the groups saw the advantage of a printed work, which could be carefully discussed (Martin Hellman interview with J. Briscoe, November 23, 1987).

But what could the two sides say to the world in common? They started from the most opposite points of view and held completely different standpoints on history. Craig Barnes recounted that Soviet
social science is concerned with huge forces of history. These were the "objective forces" which manifest themselves in revolutions, class antagonisms, and war. But there are also "subjective forces," such as the long misrule of Stalin. Subjective forces explain any failure by statesmen either to understand or carry out enlightened policies. Small groups of mankind might perhaps influence subjective forces, but could do nothing about these objective conditions. The Soviet participants, when asked to discuss social change toward a better world order, automatically thought of the eternal principles which were working themselves out in history. "We were continually asking the Russians to reach down and speak about specifics from the broad concepts and this took a great deal of stretching. We would talk about the 'process of change,' and building a constituency for change, and they could not understand what we meant. Conversely, we had a different image in our minds when they spoke of 'mechanisms' for change" (Craig Barnes interview with J. Briscoe, November 30, 1987).

A small example of a conflict of viewpoint appeared in the discussion of Paul Bracken's article concerning the instabilities in the control of nuclear forces. At a late point, after the paper had been edited and translated into Russian, Hellman expected that the Soviet side would accept it. When Alexander Nikitin requested that the author should delete the first two sentences, stating that World War I was precipitated by rigid and inflexible mobilization plans, Hellman feared that Bracken would have to rewrite the entire article and there was no time for that. Hellman remembers his anger as he suspected that Nikitin was inserting the Communist theory that wars come from imperialism.

Hellman thought the problem over that night. "I knew that getting mad at Alexander would ruin things. After cooling off, I realized he had said nothing about imperialism being the cause of war. In my frustration, I had invented that. I then realized that we all knew that greed, national arrogance, colonies and alliances had contributed to the causes. I saw an easy solution: adding the point that the powers were 'motivated by various economic and political self-interests.' Bracken accepted this change, and so did Nikitin. Had I gone with my first wave of frustration, I might have killed the project." (Martin Hellman interview with J. Briscoe, February 1, 1988).

The American Beyond War editors might have appeared to professional observers as over-rationalistic in their approach to the problems of great-power rivalry. They sincerely believed that a new way of global thinking could be adopted by human beings accustomed to the nation-state system for hundreds of years. They may have projected their own flexibility and desire for change upon mankind, visualizing the public to be more open to new ideas than it is. The Americans tended to treat historic events as freely reached decisions of officials. They had been exposed to a less deterministic version of past events and were skeptical of binding "laws of history." Americans held up ethical principles of behavior for nations as if governments were human beings in society.

In Barnes' manner one detects the underlying spirit of goodwill with which he approached the discussions, but he admitted that it is no easy matter to write jointly. Barnes said the negotiations concerning wording and inclusion of articles were as intense as any negotiations he had undertaken as an attorney. For the Soviet editors, as well, it was tense. They mentioned previous efforts to negotiate a book with another American group and noted that the conference had broken up in disagreement in 1986.

**The Americans tended to treat historic events as freely reached decisions of officials.**

William Busse, manager of the editorial team for Beyond War, remarked that the Soviet writers were taking chances with their own careers. "They have gone out on a limb because they know that his-
tonally reformation haven't worked. They took risks to be friendly with us. The
typical Russian is security conscious. So this is a beginning of stepping out in their own
scientific community and saying the things which they have said privately but have

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Barnes was aware of the limits both sets of writers felt. No person wished to be
too far ahead of acceptable opinion. Harold Sandler said, "Barnes was perhaps,
too aggressive, but due to his efforts to encourage the Soviet writers we have articles
which are in the vanguard of Soviet thinking" (Harold Sandler interview with J.
Briscoe, November 30, 1987).

Alexander Belchuk spoke to Barnes of his personal feeling that the day of export-
ing revolution was over. Barnes asked, "Could you write that in your paper? Bel-
chuk considered it and decided that he could. He wrote words to this effect, con-
cerning aggressive messianism and the imposition of revolutionary governments,
but when the Soviet editors read this phrasing, they asked, "What is this 'ag-
gressive messianism'? Everybody knows that in the west when you use the word
'aggressor' you mean Soviet. We are not going to say 'aggressive messianism.'
'Aggressive messianism' violates every agreement we have made not to cast blame in writing this book.'"

Barnes said, "You know, that sentence is important, and could be the most
important sentence in the book. It is the idea that a Soviet citizen can express him-
self in that way, even if others feel differently, and that the export of revolution
is no longer the key in Soviet foreign policy. You should leave that sentence
there, not for us, but for you. If you want good relations with Americans, tell people
that you are reconsidering the export of revolution.'"

Barnes and Belchuk went over the wording again. Belchuk was adamant. "It's
got to say 'aggressive.' It's absolutely important. 'Aggressive' is the key thing.
Anybody can be 'messianic.' I'm messianic. You're messianic. Otherwise, why are you
here? It is the export of revolution by the use of force which is outmoded and should
be abandoned" (Craig Barnes interview with J. Briscoe, November 30, 1987 and
Tape: "October Book Team to USSR Report," Beyond War Headquarters). His
strong feelings must have helped convince the Russian editors. The article contains
the statement:

... Marxist-Leninist theory has always made it clear that it is impossible to export revolu-
tion. Revolutionary transformation cannot take place unless favorable conditions exist
inside that society. Rejecting the aggressive messianic approach is consistent with this
understanding. To go out with aggressive messianic fervor and try with force to
impose revolution upon other societies against the will of the people won't work.
(Belchuk, 1988)

Each side pushed hard when it perceived one-sided slants in the book. Articles
which seemed excellent to the Americans were dropped due to the fact that they
conveyed too much of an American point of view. At first the American side had
difficulty with the Russian feelings, but as they talked and exchanged reasons, they came
to understand the Soviet objections.

Hellman could not at first understand the Soviets' resentment of the term "Russian
roulette," in his own article on the probabilities of nuclear war. "I then thought how I would feel if I were working
with Arabs and they insisted on calling the game 'Jewish roulette.' I decided they
were right. I changed it to 'pistol roulette.'" (Martin Hellman interview with J.
Briscoe, February 1, 1988).

Elena Loschenkova, Executive Secretary of the Soviet Committee, stimulated and
assisted in the preparation of the book on the Soviet side. At the end of the experi-
ence, she and Craig Barnes wrote the

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following statement concerning the joint effort:

We had to learn that we would have to be not only tolerant of each other, but sensitive in the best sense to what makes the other person uncomfortable, or nervous, or even wary of the opinion of his peers. And this is a problem which definitely goes both ways. We had to imagine what it would be like to live in the other culture and have the career obstacles, the public attitude, and the governmental leadership of the other side (1988).

In the editing, writing, and talking process the two sides lived up to the ground rule that blame would not appear in the book. Any writer could speak of general patterns of misdeeds, including mentioning the futility of such wars as Vietnam and Afghanistan. But a western writer could not specifically select Soviet errors, and vice versa.

The Americans wanted the book out before the Presidential campaign, while the Russians hoped that the book would be out by the time of the December, 1987 Summit Conference. At a conference sponsored by Beyond War in California, in April of 1987, each side challenged the other to agree to short deadlines, and the editorial portion of the book was completed before October of that year.

The setting of due dates put Sandler into a hurry to get the American articles translated during the month of May. When he carried the manuscripts to Moscow in June 1987, with a Beyond War team, he found that he had to re-edit the translations. Elena Loschenkova's technical assistant, Natalia Yampolskaya, found that the translations were not clear for a modern Russian reader. "Natalia and I were working about 16 hours a day just hammering out what was the best way to say it," said Sandler. "We worked out word by word and line by line fifteen American articles. I would get out my dictionary and we would go at it. She was a determined worker. She set herself to finish this, however long it took, regardless of the hours, and she did it" (Harold Sandler interview with J. Briscoe, November 30, 1987). At one point during the seventeen-day period in the Soviet Union, counting both Russian and English versions of the articles, there were 59 manuscripts in circulation (Craig, 1988).

Overwhelmed with this job, Sandler hired a bilingual friend in Moscow, and borrowed two interpreters from the Soviet space medicine agency, each of whom worked against tight deadlines to produce English translations of the Russian papers. Palo Alto linguists rechecked these versions to make sure that the Russian-language version was faithful to the English version.

The following are a few of the articles in the collection, indicating that the book is a part of the "new political thinking" in the Soviet Union:

Fyodor Burlatsky, Vice President of the Soviet Political Science Association and columnist for Literaturnaya Gazeta, contributed insights on the changes in socialism. His article was a plea to move the Soviet Union's Communist Party out of the Stalin mentality and into "restructuring." It deplored the failures of Khrushchev's reforms due to the conservatives within the Party. To a westerner, it appeared frank and self-critical. Burlatsky contended that the antecedents for today's perestroika are in the NEP plan of the twenties. He pointed out that Soviet dissenters had an honorable history, often paying for their courage with their lives during the Stalin period (1988).

Hellman could not at first understand the Soviet’s resentment of the term "Russian roulette"...

Anatoly Gromyko's "Security for All in the Nuclear Age" was built on ideas in his New Thinking in the Nuclear Age, which sold out almost instantly in 1985 in the Soviet Union. Gromyko asked for a new way of approaching security which takes into account the needs of both East and West. He mentioned cooperative approaches to Third World development and environmental protection. He wrote an even-tempered exposition of the world situa-
features

tion, and made an appeal to look reasonably beyond the current international differences and to see the danger of continued cold war. Gromyko suggested thinking about security in terms which include the security of all the powers. He went even beyond the Reagan proposals to urge elimination of nuclear weapons and added, "or any other means of annihilating people" (1988).

...while a single early warning and response system can be made to operate stably, two such systems tuned to each other become unstable.

Boris Raushenbakh, Professor of Theoretical Mechanics and Control, Moscow Physical Technical Institute, and winner of a Lenin Prize, laid out the danger of computer-directed war in graphic terms. Raushenbakh warned that, while a single early-warning and response system can be made to operate stably, two such systems tuned to each other become unstable. If we wire ourselves into a computerized defense and retaliation system, then the war could come about through computer triggering. "People then become the hostages of computers" (1988).

Two authors planned originally to publish a separate but related papers in the book Jerome Frank, professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins and Dr. Andrei Y. Melville, section head of Moscow's Institute on U.S.A. and Canada Studies, met in California and agreed to publish a single paper in which they discussed "The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change." They noted the universal tendency for humans to define a potentially hostile group in terms of treachery and cunning. The mass media provide a slant on stories from "the other side." Whereas "our"

intentions are honorable, "their" intentions are hostile. To end this pattern, "new thinking" would be necessary, not only among the diplomats, but through all levels of society (1988).

Ales Adamovich, now head of the Soviet Writer's Union, contributed his own essay concerning what writers can do to create the new thinking.

For me, as for most of us, the appearance of The Fate of the Earth by Jonathan Schell was of great significance. I also had the opportunity to see how very different people, from simple workmen to those high in the government, after having read that book, somehow became alike in the way they saw the realities of our world... New thinking requires a radical change. We can no longer do anything we choose. We must now reject those ideas and creations that are not for continuing the life process before they lead us to the verge of disaster (1988).

A press conference by the editors of Breakthrough was held in Washington in December, 1987. Reviews appeared in dozens of local American newspapers. By the time of the official publication date in January, 1988, Breakthrough had already sold out its first press run of 30,000 copies in the Soviet Union, and had sold 12,000 copies in the United States. A second American printing of 15,000 copies was sold out by the first of February.

Beyond War arranged visits in the United States during January for eleven Soviet authors, scheduling the writers into 560 meetings in 120 cities, meeting with 30,000 Americans. The locations included college campuses, school rooms, churches, and homes of Beyond War supporters, giving the writers an opportunity to answer questions concerning the meaning of their jointly written book (press release: Walker Publishing Co., February 1, 1988)

Boris Raushenbakh told a group, "In this book we have gotten rid of every trace of confrontation. If we remove the name of the authors we couldn't tell what side they belong to" (Martin Helfman interview with J. Briscoe, February 1, 1988).

Beyond War scheduled a national televised report on Breakthrough when the eleven authors returned to Washington. Using satellite connections with locations
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throughout the country, they described the direct, open questions which they had answered and reported on American hospitality.

In March, the Soviet Committee of Scientists for Peace Against the Nuclear Threat acted as host to a group of American writers. The book had been scheduled for review in national Soviet publications and was to be discussed in review sessions offered on the campuses of Soviet universities.

Several of the American participants in the writing said that their experience altered their view of the Soviet Union. They felt that the genuineness of the individuals with whom they dealt indicated the universality of human nature and the reality of the desire for peace. When asked about this, William Busse responded that he was basically a skeptical person. He had spent his time in the Navy searching for Soviet submarines. The Soviet writers with whom he came into contact, he said, were "quality individuals. You can tell when someone operates from a base of integrity, whether he is concerned with the future of the planet. . . . I think you build up an ability to ascertain that." (William Busse interview with J. Briscoe, November 23, 1987).

Alexander Dalin of the Hoover Institution wrote of the book: "The publication of this book is in itself a remarkable event. The views expressed in it make it even more remarkable. It gives American readers an opportunity to acquaint themselves with some of the best and freshest thinking in the Soviet Union. It gives Russian readers an array of facts and arguments they have not usually encountered in Soviet works. A surprising milestone" (Alexander Dalin to Martin E. Hellman, August 28, 1987).

Breakthrough demonstrates that planned initiatives by unofficial actors in international affairs can make a difference. The book sought to get beyond nationalistic perceptions of immediate problems, in order to confront the biggest problem: will there be a future for mankind? In the 43 years since the American and Soviet armies met in Germany, there have been many vicious propaganda attacks by each upon the other, numerous threats, and many proxy wars. With the above lessons in mind, perhaps unofficial actors can build bridges between two superpowers in tension.

About the Author

Jerry Briscoe is professor of political science at the University of the Pacific in Stockton, California. His research interests include the entry of women into politics, lobbyists, and the mass media in political life. He worked as a volunteer with Beyond War during his fall leave in 1987.

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